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ABSTRACT
Location-based services (LBS) rely on knowledge of a
user’s location to provide tailored services or information
by means of a wireless device. LBS applications have wideranging implications for society, particularly in the context
of tracking and monitoring groups of individuals such as
children, invalids, and parolees. Despite a great deal of
attention paid to technical and commercial aspects of LBS
technologies, consideration of the legal, ethical, social and
technology momentum issues involved has been wanting.
This paper examines some of the more pressing issues that
are expected to arise from the widespread use of LBS. The
outcome of this paper is the development of an LBS
privacy-security dichotomy. The dichotomy demonstrates
the importance of striking a balance between the privacy of
the individual and national security as a whole. It also
presents a realized framework for reasoning about
potentially problematic issues in LBS applications.
Keywords: location-based services, privacy, security, ethics,
social impacts.
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INTRODUCTION

We live in an era of mobility. Mobile technologies,
which allow users to move around while maintaining the
ability to access a network and its services, now claim a
significant degree of attention in both industry and
academia [1]. During this time, one particular attribute
gains critical importance: location. The ability to pinpoint a
mobile user’s location creates a new class of applications
and services. LBS cover a variety of applications, but all
have at least the underlying element in common: they all
rely on location knowledge of a user’s device to provide
tailored services or information. The devices can come in a
variety of forms such as a wireless personal digital assistant
(PDA) or mobile phone but will increasingly take the form
of emerging IP-enabled devices, given the introduction of
new protocols and location-aware infrastructure. Examples
include in-car GPS navigation, advertising targeted at a
mobile phone that enters a particular cell, and remote child
monitoring via a GPS-enabled watch.
Potentially LBS has wide-ranging implications for
society. In fact, LBS have been described as being “without
a doubt one of the most exciting developments to emerge
from the mobile telecommunications sector” [2]. However,

as newer positioning technologies are introduced into the
market with a greater ability to determine location in terms
of precision and existing technologies are integrated to
overcome limitations, issues pertaining to the use and
potential misuse of location information rise to the fore. In
addition to this, perhaps because LBS are so new, there has
hitherto been limited investigation into exactly what effects
the widespread use of these technologies may have. This
paper examines the various implications that arise from the
use of LBS, including legal, ethical, social and technology
momentum issues. The analysis culminates in a discussion
and illustrated representation of the LBS trade-off between
privacy and security, and the presentation of a realized
framework for reasoning about issues in LBS.
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WHY STUDY POTENTIAL ISSUES
ASSOCIATED WITH THE USE OF
LOCATION SERVICES?

It is often stated that the changes LBS bring about will be
dramatic, with some even going so far as to say that “this
technological revolution will directly or indirectly affect in
a significant way practically every person in the
industrialized world” [3]. LBS are expected to create a
radical paradigm shift in the way people live. However,
LBS themselves are far more developed than the available
research on their potential societal implications. This is
clearly not an ideal position for a technical solution which
is considered to closely connect with people’s private lives,
but also with the evident possibility to affect society at
large. Thus it is vitally important to consider and provoke
debate as to where society is headed with such
technological capabilities and innovations. No specific laws
and almost no regulations have been written to deal with
the possible uses and/ or misuses of LBS. Surely, on the
brink of a future where LBS are ubiquitous, one needs to
critically speculate on both the unintended effects and
consequences.

3
3.1

LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES
Controlling Others

According to Ermann and Shauf, our “ethical standards
and social institutions have not yet adapted… to the moral
dilemmas that result from computer technology” [4]. Take
the example of a woman who uses LBS tracking to watch

over her ailing husband, who has recently survived a heart
attack. She is willing to “help” her husband look after
himself by monitoring him and restricting the activities she
allows him to participate in, especially when he is alone. It
is not too difficult to imagine this type of LBS monitoring
application becoming commonplace. It is also conceivable
that, for some people in such circumstances, the authority to
monitor could be held by a hospital or health insurance
provider.
What is of utmost importance in this conceivable
scenario is that concern for the physical welfare of another
person is balanced with their need to be an autonomous
being. Consideration of legal issues is also important – it
does not appear that countries like Australia or the United
States have legislation that covers the unique possibilities
that arise from LBS tracking. One situation that is likely to
arise with greater frequency is people using LBS
technologies to monitor loved ones “for their own good”.
Several fundamental issues need to be directly addressed as
a result. When is a person sufficiently impaired to warrant
monitoring? Should their consent be necessary? What if
they are considered to be too impaired to make a rational
decision about being monitored? These sorts of archetypal
questions require urgent resolution as LBS monitoring is
predicted to become mainstream. In addition, we could also
consider the murky difference between ‘monitoring’ and
‘surveillance’ per se.

3.2

The Human Need for Autonomy

In most expressions of Western liberalism personal
autonomy is considered an integral part of an individual’s
identity. Resistance to a situation is often unconsciously
employed to “preserve psychically vital states of autonomy,
identity, and self-cohesion from potentially destabilizing
impingements” [5]. If a person’s resistance is bypassed or
circumvented, their adaptive capacities can be overloaded,
inducing feelings of desperation and helplessness. The
natural reaction to this is to exert an immediate
counterforce in an attempt to re-establish the old balance, or
even to establish a new balance with which the individual
can feel comfortable.
Autonomy becomes an issue when an individual is
closely watched or monitored, and so LBS tracking may
have adverse psychological effects on the person being
monitored, no matter how well justified that external
influence might be. With this in mind, perhaps the only way
to implement a monitoring program for an aging individual
is to develop a partnership with that person. In this type of
arrangement, LBS tracking can be an agreement, i.e. a joint
process, that “is continually informed by the goal of
fostering … autonomy” [5].

3.3
The Legalities and Ethics of PreEmptive Control
Another significant legal and ethical dilemma is that of
monitoring people who are suspected of criminal activities
or even terrorism, using special court-obtained warrants.
This is not mere fancy– the Australian Government for
instance, has already passed new anti-terrorism laws that,
among other things, give police and security agencies the
power to fit terror suspects with tracking devices for up to
12 months [6]. These kinds of powers are particularly
problematic. Can it be considered reasonable to impinge
upon the freedom of someone who is merely suspected of
committing a crime? And how much evidence and/ or what
type of evidence needs to be gathered in order for a warrant
to be issued to authorities? At the present time, ambiguous
terminology in both Australian and United States terrorismrelated legislation, does not rule out the possibility of
authorities using highly invasive chip implant technology to
track suspected terrorists.
Criminals surrender a number of their natural rights by
committing an offence. By rebelling against society’s laws,
freedoms such as the right to liberty are forfeited. This is
known as retributivism (colloquially known as “just
deserts”). The central idea is proportionality: “punishment
should be proportionate to the gravity of, and culpability
involved in, the offence” [7]. With no crime involved, the
punishment of electronic monitoring or home detention
must be considered out of proportion.
However, this is not the first instance in which countries
similar to Australia have created preventative legislation. In
1994, the Community Protection Act was enacted in the
state of NSW. This law allowed anyone to be detained in
prison for up to 6 months if the Court was satisfied that “the
person [was] more likely than not to commit a serious act of
violence [that involves a real likelihood of causing death or
serious injury, or involves sexual assault], and that it is
appropriate, for the protection of a particular person or
persons or the community generally, that the person be held
in custody” [8]. The first time the law was invoked, it was
struck down (to the Government’s considerable
embarrassment) [9].
The Australian Constitution requires trial by jury for all
indictable offences. Is it fair to imprison someone in any
way, without due process of law, if they have not
committed an indictable offence? Gaudron J’s comments
about the Community Protection Act 1994 included the
following:
[T]he proceedings are directed to the making of a guess –
perhaps an educated guess, but a guess nonetheless –
whether, on the balance of probabilities, the appellant
will commit an offence… That is the antithesis of the
judicial process [10].
With measures such as those in Australia’s new counterterrorism laws, there is obviously an absolute need for

caution, accountability and review in the exercise of such
powers. The London bombings are the justification offered
repeatedly by the Prime Minister for the new laws,
reinforced by ASIO director-general Paul O’Sullivan.
However, this “justification” ignores the reality that “the
London bombers were ‘clean skins’ who had escaped
police notice altogether” [11]. Tagging suspicious people
cannot keep society completely safe because of the notion
of singularities- surprise terrorist attacks that cannot be
predicted or prevented using any amount of monitoring or
control [12].
The researchers do not make a judgment on whether preemptive control legislation is good or bad. It is suggested,
however, that the laws developed by the Federal
Government (and agreed to by the States) could be
indicative of a broader trend. Prime Minister John Howard
said that “[i]n other circumstances I would never have
sought these new powers. But we live in very dangerous
and different and threatening circumstances… I think all of
these powers are needed” [13]. Could the same argument be
used in the future to justify monitoring everyone in the
country? Everyone’s privacy being invaded in such a way
would likely lower significantly the chance of crimes being
committed, or at least the chance of criminals remaining
unpunished. If pre-emptive control is a part of government
security, then widespread LBS monitoring could be the
most effective form of implementation.
Without suggesting an extreme Orwellian scenario where
draconian policies and laws mean that the entire population
is tracked every moment of their lives, there is a possibility
that the current climate is indicative of individuals’
willingness to relinquish their privacy (or at least someone
else’s) for the sake of enhanced security.

4
4.1

4.2

Trust is a vitally important part of human existence. It
develops as early as the first year of life and continues to
shape our interactions with others until the day we die [16].
In relationships, a lack of trust means that there is also no
bonding, no giving, and no risk-taking [17]. In fact, Marano
states:
Without trust, there can be no meaningful connection to
another human being. And without connection to one
another, we literally fall apart. We get physically sick.
We get depressed. And our minds… run away with
themselves [16].
The issue of trust in the use of LBS recalls Perolle’s
notion of surveillance being practiced in low-trust situations,
and the idea that the very act of monitoring destroys trust
[18]. Again, this is apparent in the example of the woman
who monitors her ailing spouse. She does not trust her
husband enough to let him make his own decisions. He
probably resents her 24x7 intrusion into his daily activities,
but tolerates it out of love and because he does not wish to
upset his wife. Their relationship could be expected to
become increasingly dysfunctional, if there is a breakdown
of trust. It is near impossible to predict the complex effects
of LBS when used to track humans in this way, especially
as each person has a different background, culture and
upbringing. However, if Perolle [18] and Weckert [19] are
agreed with, these types of technological solutions may
well contribute to the erosion of trust in human
relationships– what would this entail for society at large?
Freedom and trust go hand-in-hand. These are celebrated
concepts which have been universally connected to civil
liberties by most political societies.

SOCIAL ISSUES

Control

Control emerges as a significant theme in LBS. It can be
argued that many, if not all, LBS applications have an
overarching element of control [14]. Monitoring LBS
devices are about controlling others, whether through
altruism, pragmatism or necessity. The use of LBS in a
business context can be about controlling the types of
advertisements that are delivered to a potential customer,
and where the person is when they receive those
advertisements. An individual’s use of a GPS-enabled
mobile device is often about control over their own selfdirection. Even LBS applications that are ostensibly for
care or convenience-related purposes do exhibit aspects of
control [15]. In the “husband and wife” example given in
section 3.1, the monitoring wife has control over her
monitored husband, and in turn this curtails the control the
husband exerts over his own life.

Trust
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5.1

TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES

The Technological Momentum of LBS

Some believe that technology is the driving force that
shapes the way we live. This theory is known as
technological determinism, one of the basic tenets of which
is that “changes in technology are the single most important
source of change in society” [20]. The idea is that
technological forces contribute more to social change than
even political, economic or environmental factors.
The present researchers would not go so far as to
subscribe to this strongest sense of technological
determinism doctrine. The social setting in which the
technology emerges is at least as important as the
technology itself in determining how society is shaped. As
Braun writes: “[t]he successful artifacts of technology are
chosen by a social selection environment, [like] the success
of living organisms is determined by a biological selection
environment” [21]. Technologies that fail to find a market
never have a chance to change society, so society shapes

technology at least as much as it is shaped by technology.
In this light, Hughes’s theory of technological momentum
is a useful alternative to technological determinism: similar
in that it is time-dependent and focuses on technology as a
force of change, but sensitive to the complexities of society
and culture [22].
Technological potential is not necessarily social destiny.
However, in the case of LBS, it is plausible to expect it to
create a shift in the way people live. This shift can already
be seen occurring in parents who monitor their children
with LBS tracking devices for safety reasons, and in home
detention and parole programs that are administered
outside prisons to minimize costs and encourage
rehabilitation. As described previously, the threat of

terrorist attacks has led the Australian Government to
bestow upon itself extraordinary powers that never could
have been justified previously. In this situation, LBS has
enabled the electronic monitoring of suspicious persons,
however, it is not the technology alone that acts as the
impetus. Pre-emptive electronic tracking could not be put in
place without LBS. Neither would it be tolerated without
society believing (rightly or not, and at least for an
extended period of time) that it is necessary in the current
climate. Although technology is not the sole factor in social
change, and arguably not the most important, LBS are
gaining momentum and are likely to contribute to a shift in
the way people live and work.

Table 1: Positives and negatives of LBS for different user types
User Type
Voluntary user. The most
likely type, probably using
commercial LBS
applications such as invehicle routing and
navigation.

Mandatory user. Possible
in the form of government
applications (e.g. home
imprisonment) and
domestic applications (e.g.
tracking minors).

Non-user. Unlikely to be a
large group if LBS
become widespread. Many
in this category would
have personal reasons for
not adopting LBS, or
could not afford to use the
technology.

Positives
• Choice. User can opt out of LBS by
shutting down, deactivating the device or
leaving it in a stationary position.
• Safety. Accurate location information
may provide timely help in the event of
an emergency.
• Convenience. E.g. increased ease of
routine transactions such as at toll-ways.
• Security of the individual. E.g. building
access, navigational capabilities.
• Safety. Personal security may be
increased– if someone can see where the
user is at all times.
• Accountability. Location can be
monitored constantly, so the user may be
held responsible for their activities. If a
crime is committed, they may be
implicated or cleared based on location
information.
• Security of society. The user’s knowledge
that someone can see their every move
may prevent them from taking part in a
criminal activity.
• Privacy. Personal location information
remains relatively protected.
• Autonomy. High level of independence
and control over their own activities.
• Simplicity. There is no need to deal with
the possibility of the technology failing.

Negatives
• Security risk. Even though use is voluntary,
the user has a lack of control over who
accesses location information.
• Privacy risk. Things such as location
information and automated transactions can
be traced back to the user.
• False sense of security. Someone watching
from afar cannot necessarily help in an
emergency situation such as in the
prevention of a kidnapping or attack.
• Invasion of privacy. Location can be viewed
at any time, with or without user consent.
• Security risk. Location information is
constantly available, so data leaks are
potentially very serious.
• Decreased autonomy. Independence is
important to mental and emotional
wellbeing.
• May give user a false sense of security.
Someone watching from afar cannot
necessarily prevent harm to another.
• May give society a false sense of security.
Monitoring does not mean that a crime
cannot be committed.
• Safety risk. Help may be delayed in the
event of an emergency, although programs
like E911 now mean that emergency
services can pinpoint a caller’s location
with an accuracy of between 50 and 300
meters [24].
• Security risk. The person’s activities may
pose a danger to society, community misses
out on the security benefits of LBS.
• Risk of prejudice. A person may be
suspected of wrongdoing without evidence,
simply by reason of opting-out of LBS.

5.2

Technology Is Not Infallible

If LBS do become an integral part of daily life, it must be
considered what will happen in the instances that the
technology will inevitably fail- whether it fails to record
location data properly, provides inaccurate measures, is
accessed by unauthorized persons, or the secondary support
systems fail. No technology is fail-safe. There are
invariably shortcomings, limitations, and the unforeseen.
An example is the use of electronic monitoring in parole
and home imprisonment programs. One U.S. study found
that about 75 percent of electronically monitored “walk
offs” were re-apprehended within 24 hours [23]. That
means a quarter of these people went free for more than a
day– sufficient time to commit other offences. And,
although the offender may be caught and punished, it is
difficult to remedy the damage committed to a victim of
crime.
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EVALUATING LBS

Any technology can be expected to typically have both
positive and negative effects on individuals and on the
wider community. Emmanuel Mesthane of Harvard’s
former Technology and Society Program wrote: “[n]ew
technology creates new opportunities for men and societies
and it also generates new problems for them. It has both
positive and negative effects and it usually has the two at
the same time and in virtue of each other” [25]. The assets
and liabilities that flow from LBS (to the individual
involved and to society as a whole) depend largely on
whether the person using the technology does so of their
own accord, or is required to use it for one reason or

Exposure

another. There are a different set of pros and cons related to
people who do not use LBS at all. Some of the benefits and
drawbacks for voluntary, mandatory and non-users of LBS
are presented in Table 1.
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RISK TO THE INDIVIDUAL VS. RISK
TO SOCIETY

From Table 1, it is obvious that there is an inherent tradeoff between the interests of the individual and the interests
of society as a whole: the privacy of the individual is in
conflict with the safety of the broader community. As G.T.
Marx reflects, “[h]ow is the desire for security balanced
with the desire to be free from intrusions?” [26] This work
is certainly not the first to allude to this issue. For example,
Kun has said that “perhaps one of the greatest challenges of
this decade will be how we deal with this theme of privacy
vs. national security” [27]. The original contribution of this
paper is that the dilemma has been related specifically to
LBS, under the privacy-security dichotomy. Here, each side
of the dichotomy is divided into three key components that
combine to greatly magnify risk. Sections 7.1 and 7.2
describe the factors present in each dichotomy. Removing
one or more components for each set decreases the privacy
or security risk. Where more elements are present in
conjunction, the risk is increased.

7.1

Privacy Risk

Significant privacy risk occurs when the following
factors are present:
• Omniscience– LBS tracking is mandatory, so
authorities have near-perfect knowledge of people’s

Omniscience

Limitedness

PRIVACY
RISK

SECURITY
RISK
Corruption

Figure 1: Privacy risk

Vulnerability

Fraudulence

Figure 2: Security risk

whereabouts and activities.
• Exposure– security of LBS systems is imperfect,
leaving them open to unauthorized access.
• Corruption– motive exists to abuse location-related
data. This includes unauthorized or improper
changes, thus compromising content integrity.
It is not difficult to see why the danger in this privacyrisk scenario is so great. A nation with all-knowing
authorities means that a large amount of highly sensitive
information is stored about all persons in the country.
Security of electronic systems is never completely
foolproof. And, where there is something to be gained,
corrupt behavior is usually in the vicinity. The combination
of all three factors creates a serious threat to privacy.

7.2

Security Risk

Significant security risk occurs with the following
conditions:
• Limitedness– authorities have limited knowledge of
people’s activities.
• Vulnerability– security of individuals and
infrastructure is imperfect.
• Fraudulence– motive exists to commit crimes.
This security-risk dimension is a life situation which
people have to contend with in the present day: limitedness,
vulnerability, and fraudulence. Law enforcement authorities
cannot be everywhere at once, nor can they have instant
knowledge of unlawful activity. Security of infrastructure
and people can never be absolute. In addition to this, there
are always people willing to commit crimes for one reason
or another. These factors merge to form a situation in which

crimes can be committed against people and property
relatively easily, with at least some chance of the
perpetrator remaining unidentified.

7.3
How Much Are We Willing to
Compromise?
As mentioned above, the security-risk half of the
dichotomy typifies our current environment. However, the
majority of society manages to live contentedly, despite a
certain level of vulnerability and the modern-day threat of
terrorism. The security-risk seems magnified when
examined in the context of the LBS privacy-security
dichotomy. LBS have the potential to greatly enhance both
national and personal security, but not without creating a
different kind of threat to the privacy of the individual. The
principal question is: how much privacy are we willing to
trade in order to increase security? Is the privacy-risk
scenario depicted above a preferable alternative to the
security-risk society lives with now? Or would society lose
more than it gains? And how are we to evaluate potential
ethical scenarios in the context of utilitarianism,
Kantianism, or social contract theory?

8

RESOLVING THE ISSUES

This paper has already identified four types of issues
associated with LBS: legal, social, ethical and technological.
From the preceding information, we can begin to see one
overriding theme for each of these issues:
• Legal– control of others, with or without their

Figure 3: Relationships between major issues in LBS

Table 2: Issues framework for LBS
Privacy
• Who has access to location information?
• Can an individual wearing a tracking device
deactivate it?
• Do the benefits that accrue from LBS in a given
context outweigh the impacts of seriously invading
an individual’s privacy?
• Is this individual’s privacy worth more than the
safety and security of society?

Security
• What restrictions are placed on organisations (and
their employees) that handle location information?
• How well protected are the LBS electronic systems
and subsequent support systems?
• What measures are in place to manage mandatory
LBS users?
• What backup measures are in place in case the
system fails?
consent
• Social– trust in human relationships
• Ethical– privacy of the individual
• Technological– security and reliability of LBS
systems
These four major issues can be summarized as control,
trust, privacy and security.

8.1
Relationships Between Control, Trust,
Privacy and Security
The issues of control, trust, privacy and security are
interrelated. As discussed above, increased control can
impinge or even destroy trust. I.e. there is no need to be
concerned with trusting someone when you can monitor
them from afar. In contrast, increased trust would normally
mean increased privacy. An individual who has confidence
in another person to avoid intentionally doing anything to
adversely affect them, probably does not feel the need to
scrutinize that person’s activities.
Privacy requires security as well as trust. A person’s
privacy can be seriously violated by a security breach of an
LBS system, with their location information being accessed
by unauthorized parties. The other effect of system security,
however, is that it enhances control. A secure system means
that tracking devices cannot be removed without
authorization, therefore, control is increased. Of course,
control and privacy are mutually exclusive. Constant
monitoring destroys privacy, and privacy being paramount

Control
• Who is controlling whom, and for what reasons?
• Does the person to be monitored need to consent?
• Is an individual too impaired to consent to their own
monitoring? If so, who should be able to make the
decision for them?
• If an individual does not consent to monitoring, are
there special circumstances (e.g. an indictable
crime), that warrants control without consent?
• How can it be ensured that inaccuracies in reported
location do not adversely affect the individual being
monitored?
Trust
• Does the LBS context already involve a low level of
trust?
• If the LBS context involves a moderate to high level
of trust, why are LBS being considered anyway?
• Will the use of LBS in this situation be trust-building
or trust-destroying?

rules out the possibility of LBS tracking. These
relationships are summarized in Figure 3.

8.2

Guiding Deliberation

The above discussion of latent and realized concerns in
LBS underscores the following question: with the lattice of
issues involved and the potentially dangerous implications
of not taking these into account, how should LBS be used?
Mason and Mason et al. developed a framework of
questions for reasoning about ethical issues in electronic
commerce [28]. The researchers suggest the use of a similar
framework for discussion and thought on the most critical
issues in implementing LBS [29]. This would go some way
toward overcoming the difficulty of using LBS both
lawfully and properly. Table 2 presents this original
framework, derived from information presented previously
in this paper.
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CONCLUSION

This paper has examined the major legal, ethical, social
and technological issues involved in the use of LBS. It has
been shown that the benefits and drawbacks of LBS (for
both the individual and for society) largely depend on the
type of user and given context. The outcome of this paper is
in its LBS-specific examination and diagrammatic
representation of the dichotomous relationship between the
privacy of the individual and the security of society.
Another key attainment presented here is the LBS issues

framework which includes privacy, control, security and
trust.
LBS are beginning to make their way into the
mainstream. However, it seems that there has been little
consideration of the possible implications of these
technologies, particularly compared to the degree of
attention that technical and commercial aspects of LBS
have received. With the very real potential of LBS to create
social change it is vitally important to begin looking at why
LBS should be used in certain contexts and to address the
social, legal, ethical and technological issues that arise from
the technology’s implementation. The recommendations are
to go beyond socio-ethical guidelines (themselves crucially
important), and to implement fair-practices, standards and
regulations that determine what can and cannot be achieved
using LBS by any number of stakeholders in the value
chain.
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